DIRECTIVE 2017-19
October 3, 2017

To: All County Boards of Elections
   Directors, Deputy Directors, and Board Members

Re: Reminder of Important Security Precautions and Practices

SUMMARY

Prior to the November 2016 Presidential Election, my office issued several reminders to boards of elections regarding security best practices and precautions. The purpose of this Directive is to remind boards of elections of these practices and precautions and ensure that they are being routinely exercised, especially as a board prepares for a general election. Additionally, each board of elections must review the guidance and instructions on security provided in Chapter 2 of the Election Official Manual.

This Directive is intended to serve as a supplement to the security requirements outlined in Chapters 2, 7, and 10 of the Election Official Manual.

INSTRUCTIONS

I. EMAIL

Directors and deputy directors must remind all staff who have access to a computer within the board of elections’ office to exercise caution when opening emails. When using a computer within the board of elections’ office, an email user should not open any email that appears to be spam or suspicious or that is unsolicited and contains an attachment.

It is imperative that board of elections’ staff know how to recognize and how to handle a suspicious email. A suspicious email might be any email:

- With an uncommon domain name (the domain name is the portion of the email address that follows the “@” symbol) or with a domain name that contains numbers inside of brackets – i.e., @[3456];
- That is sent from someone unknown to the recipient and contains an attachment or a link within the body of the message;
- That is sent from someone known to the recipient but is unsolicited or unexpected and contains an attachment or link within the body of the email;
- That requests personal information (e.g., credit card numbers, user names/passwords, etc.) or money;
• That appears to have been sent from a well-known company or organization but contains spelling errors, poor grammar, or threats (e.g., “if you do not respond to this email, your account will be closed”);

A recipient should never open, respond, reply to, or forward a suspicious email. Instead, the recipient should notify the designated contact person within the board or county that a suspicious email has been received. Additionally, a recipient should not open or download any files attached to a suspicious email or click on any links within the body of the email.

Directors and deputy directors also must instruct all staff who have access to a computer within the board of elections’ office on how to handle suspicious emails. Each board should discuss safe email practices with its or the county’s IT personnel or the county’s data processing center board administrator and establish a procedure for notifying the appropriate IT personnel of a suspicious email.

Additional information on types of suspicious emails and phishing attempts – and on how to identify and report suspicious emails to several common email account providers – may be found by using the following links:

Google: https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8253?hl=en
AT&T: https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/email-support/KM1010551

II. WEBSITE, SYSTEM, AND DATA SECURITY

Each board of elections must take every precaution available to ensure the security of its website, systems, and data. A board, if it has not already, should discuss what security precautions are in place with its voting system, voter registration, and website vendors.

A board also should apply the following best practices:

• Confirm that search fields on its website are locked in such a way as to limit the risks of SQL injection attacks.
• Implement and utilize firewalls to protect against unauthorized access.
• Ensure that all ports in the board’s voter registration server (except the port for the Statewide Voter Registration Database connection) are locked and routinely monitored.
• Limit access to systems and data only to those agents and employees who require access. A board should know when, and for what purpose, anyone – even an authorized user – is accessing any aspect of the board’s voter registration or election management system. To that end, the board should utilize the systems’ auditing and
intrusion detection capabilities and monitor the systems to determine whether any unauthorized access or attempted access has occurred.

- Do not connect the voter registration database or election management system to any other system that is not required for their use.
- Wherever permitted (i.e., not with your central tabulating system that requires federal certification of material changes), be sure to use current versions (with relevant security updates) of operating systems, software, and web content management programs (e.g., WordPress, etc.). Using the current versions helps protect the board’s systems against known vulnerabilities.
- Limit access to any network (wired or wireless) to authorized users who have been provided with the necessary network credentials, security key, and/or access code for connection. A board should consider the following safeguards for networked communication:
  - Secure any router according to industry standards for security.
  - Utilize non-broadcasting Service Set Identifier (SSID) to make the access point invisible on most wireless and mobile devices.
- Take advantage of the cyber hygiene and risk and vulnerability assessment services offered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. For details on available services, please email the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council at SLTTCyber@hq.dhs.gov.

III. BACKUP OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND ELECTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DATA

The board’s voter registration data should be backed up on a daily basis. If unwanted modifications to the data occur, or a situation requires recovery of data, the database can be restored to its last known state. If the board’s voter registration system vendor needs remote access to the system to perform backups, the board should ensure that this access is password protected. A board may want to consider locking vendor access except for pre-determined timeframes or require pre-authorization prior to remote access of the server.

The board’s election definition data from its central tabulation system should be backed up after the board has completed its programming for the election and after any change is made to backup data available on the system. It also should be backed up after any change is made to the board’s election definitions, so that, if unauthorized modifications occur, the data can be restored.

The medium containing the backup data from both the board’s voter registration and election management systems should be stored in a secure, offsite location at least once per week, and the board should utilize encryption to protect any data containing confidential or personal information.
IV. PROHIBITION ON INTERNET CONNECTION

No part of a voting system, including the system’s tabulation server, may be connected to the internet. R.C. 3506.23.

V. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL INFORMATION

Each board is reminded that a voter’s driver’s license or state identification card number must never be disclosed, appear on the board’s website, or be accessible to precinct election officials on a signature pollbook or electronic pollbook. A board is encouraged to consult with its legal counsel, the county prosecuting attorney, regarding what information must be disclosed and what information must not be disclosed in response to a public records’ request.

VI. RE-REVIEW OF CHAPTER 2 OF THE ELECTION OFFICIAL MANUAL

Each board of elections must re-review the Security section of Chapter 2 of the Election Official Manual to refresh recollection on the guidance and instructions provided on the following topics:

- Security of the Board Office;
- Secure and Proper Storage of Voting Equipment;
- Inventory of Voting Equipment;
- Secure and Proper Storage of Ballots and Election Data Media;
- Inventory of Ballots;
- Security of Voting System and Tabulation Programs/Software;
- Passwords;
- User Account Management; and
- Access Log; and Third Party Access to Voting System

If you have questions regarding this Directive, please contact the Secretary of State’s elections counsel assigned to your county at (614) 466-2585.

Sincerely,

Jon Husted

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1 Passwords to any system or service accessed frequently or at regular intervals should generally be changed every 90 days. It is recommended that passwords for voting systems and services be reset before each election whenever practicable. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has information on passwords at https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2013/05/08/protecting-your-personal-information-secure-passwords and https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Best%20Practices%20for%20Creating%20a%20Password.pdf.